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So REASON CAN RULE. By Scott Buchanan. New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux. 1982. Pp. vii, 321. cloth $12.95; paper $5.95. 
So Reason Can Rule collects thirteen essays on law and politics by Scott 
Buchanan, the late educator and philosopher. 1 The book displays 
Buchanan's extensive knowledge of Western intellectual heritage, drawing 
on sources from nearly all Western cultures since Classical Greece. Al-
though written over a 15 year period, the essays together present a coherent, 
readable version of what Buchanan viewed as society's fundamental polit-
ical problems and a prescription for refo:m. 
Buchanan aligns himself with the social contract theorists of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. The principle of consent and federalism 
underlie much of his political thought. "Democracy as self-government or 
government by the consent of the governed, is not one of many forms of 
government," Buchanan states. Echoing several social contract theorists,2 
he claims, "[I]t is a principle of all government; governments derive their 
just power from the consent of the governed" (p. 69). The United States 
Constitution, according to Buchanan, confirms this principle (p. 185). 
Buchanan also adopts the views of Montesquieu, who observed that "[i]t is 
natural for a republic to have only a small territory,"3 and thus that a large 
territory or population would have to employ the federal principle in creat-
ing a republic (pp. 39, 150). 
These two principles also lie at the foundation of Buchanan's proposal 
for political reform - to grant charters to all private, voluntary associa-
tions, corporations, and institutions, to grant them the power of self-govern-
ment, and to coordinate these chartered institutions according to a federal 
scheme (pp. 168-76). Buchanan proposes that a "subconstitutional federa-
tion [of these organizations] be set up, or imagined, as a new branch of 
government, independent and autonomous . . . ." (p. 176). In other words, 
Buchanan envisions establishing a federation in which such organizations 
have a status roughly equivalent to that afforded the States in the present 
scheme. 
Buchanan advances this striking proposal in response to two perceived 
I. Mr. Buchanan died in 1973. He is best known for establishing the "New Program" at St. 
Johns College, Annapolis, Maryland and Sante Fe, New Mexico, commonly known as the 
"Great Books" program. Buchanan was concerned that prevailing trends in education were 
not properly preparing students for life as citizens and were ignoring the intellectual founda-
tions of our society. Accordingly, Buchanan, in conjunction with other notable educators such 
as Robert Maynard Hutchins, designed a curriculum in selected great books in fields such as 
classical and modem languages, mathematics and natural sciences. This book, the first in a 
planned series, was assembled for publication by a committee of Buchanan's friends, col-
leagues, and students, in an effort to bring his work to a wider audience. Pp. xi-xii. See also 
ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, THE ST. JOHN'S PROGRAM v (1955); N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1968, at 41, col. 
I. 
2. For writings of major seventeenth and eighteenth century social contract theorists, see T, 
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 129-45 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1946); J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERN-
MENT 374-77 (P. Laslett ed.1960); J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 7 
(G. Cole trans. 1950). 
3. C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 120 (T, Nugent trans. 1949). 
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problems: first, the demise of reason, and the substitution of self-interest, in 
the legislative process; second, the failure of the present scheme of self-gov-
ernment to educate the citizenry. 
Writing on the demise of reason, Buchanan declares that "[u]nder our 
Constitution the law divides itself so that reason can rule" (p. 228). In other 
words: "Following Locke and Montesquieu, the Constitution distinguishes 
three great offices, powers, or functions: the legislature, the executive, and 
the judiciary; and to them are assigned respectively three uses of practical 
reason: the making of laws, the executing or administration of laws, and 
the adjudication of laws" (p. 198). Reason was to function in each of these 
branches. Courts, for example, add reasons to the interests of the parties (p. 
62). The Constitution, for Buchanan, protects members of the legislature 
from the influence of interests and powers that might impair the use of 
reason (p. 63). On the executive level, administrative agencies are empow-
ered to hold hearings at which parties will present reasons for a particular 
ruling (p. 63). Thus, the potential for reason to rule exists in every branch of 
government. 
According to Buchanan, however, this potential remains largely unreal-
ized. The drafters of the Constitution did not anticipate the rise of the cor-
poration, party politics, and lobbying (pp. 87-88). ''To the eighteenth-
century mind, which sought to ensure its liberties by separating governmen-
tal powers and trusting them to rational debate, the addition of economic 
powers, money, industry, and welfare to the fragile political forms of the 
republic is letting the bull loose in the china shop" (p. 96). One reason a 
republic can exist only in a small territory, according to Montesquieu, is 
that in a small territory the common good is easier to discem.4 Buchanan, 
then, proposes that the federalist principle be extended to all associations so 
that reason, with a view to the common good (as opposed to the interests of 
powerful groups), can rule. 
As for the failure of the present scheme of self-government to educate 
the citizenry, Buchanan writes that the 
Founding Fathers all learned through their tutors what Montesquieu had 
said, that the principle of the republican form of government is political 
virtue, and that the source of such virtue is education . . . . They did their 
best to give this country the basic and comprehensive legal structure that 
would make the day-to-day life and work of the citizen and the officials 
self-educative.5 . 
In Buchanan's view the citizens of a republic are educated in part by 
participating in the process of self-government: "[T]he laws are the teach-
ers, and . . . the making, obeying, and remaking of laws is the essence of 
collective self-education" (p. 20). In a society as large as our own, citizen 
participation in self-government, and thus in the process of self-education, 
is minimal. By extending self-government, under a federal scheme, to all 
private voluntary associations, presumably citizen participation in self-gov-
ernment and the self-educative process would increase. Participation in 
4. Id. 
5. P. 21. The Montesquieu passage alluded to can be found in C. MONTESQUIEU, supra 
note 3, at 34. 
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tum instills political virtue, the principle of republican government, in the 
citizens. 
Thus, as far as it goes, the political philosophy expressed in So Reason 
Can Rule is well-integrated. Governments derive their just powers from 
the consent of the governed: self-government is the principle of all govern-
ment. Through participation in self-government, citizens acquire political 
virtue, which is the principle of self-government. In a large society, not 
only is citizen participation and self-education minimal, but the common 
good is hard to discern. Economics and political interest, not reason, be-
come the dominant influences on law-making. Chartering public and pri-
vate organizations, and thereby granting iliem powers of self-government, 
and coordinating them under a federal scheme, responds to these problems. 
The main problem with this political philosophy is one that Buchanan 
was aware of when he stated: "I confess I have no detailed blueprint" (p. 
177).6 Even this candid admission may be understated. One has to wonder: 
Are for-profit corporations really to be allowed to govern themselves, and 
given powers comparable to those of States? Certain passages suggest that 
this is indeed what Buchanan intended: "[I]t would be interesting to see if 
replacing the Sherman antitrust law by the ensurance of a republican form 
of government to all private corporations would . . . hasten the present 
tendency of the business corporation to accept more community responsi-
bilities" (p. 98). Granting private corporations the powers of self- govern-
ment might just as easily hasten their tendency to ignore community needs. 
Perhaps unchecked self-government by for-profit corporations is not in-
tended (pp. 176-77), but _as it stands, So Reason Can Rule admits of this 
interpretation. 
Another detail left to the reader's imagination is whether for-profit cor-
porations in this scheme will be managed democratically. This would im-
pose a significant cost in terms of economic efficiency. The management 
and ownership of corporations were originally separated because distribut-
ing all information relevant to every particular decision to all owners, or 
citizens of the newly chartered corporation in this case, is expensive. Addi-
tional expense could be expected to accrue from organizing citizens when-
ever a decision is at hand. Further, the average citizen cannot be expected 
to have the education or skills of professional management.7 
A final difficulty with So Reason Can Rule relates to a characterization 
of the ideal state of affairs. Elaborating on Kant,8 Buchanan asserts that 
"all good laws must be rules of reason within a kingdom of nature, or ends 
in which men are masters or the ends-in-themselves" (p. 309). Though men 
are to be ends-in-themselves, Buchanan implies that the United States 
should establish this kingdom of ends in undeveloped countries (pp. 15, 
320). To impose a form of government on a people is inconsistent with 
6. For a more detailed proposal, see R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE 
GIANT CORPORATION (1976). See also, Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: Constitu-
tional Challenges, 61 GEO. LJ. U3 (1972). 
7. See Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against JJefensive Tactics 
in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 834 (1981). 
8. See generally, I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (L. Beck trans. 
1959). 
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treating them as ends-in-themselves. Though self-government may be the 
best form of government, a nation must adopt this form on its own. Other-
wise, the nation's citizens have not consented to the government, and its 
authority, on Buchanan's own premises, would not be legitimate. 
So Reason Can Rule presents an interesting and coherent, albeit some-
what general, political philosophy that accommodates the modem corpora-
tion, in whatever form, within traditional natural law and social contract 
theory. The several essays collected in the book also describe the function 
of law in a government such as that established by our Constitution. The 
principle difficulty with the book, perhaps attributable to the fact that it is a 
collection of essays, is the highly abstract level at which the exposition of 
political philosophy proceeds. For the lawyer seeking the answer to a par-
ticular practical problem, the book is unlikely to be of help. But for those 
wishing to contemplate the function oflaw under our Constitution, So Rea-
son Can Rule makes thought-provoking reading. 
